![]() ![]() MacArthur set forth his belief that the United States should-and in time could-hold the entire Philippine archipelago. Army Forces in the Far East, was largely responsible for a new plan. In the summer and fall of 1941, however, the infectious and misplaced optimism and dynamism of General Douglas MacArthur, who at the end of July was appointed Commander, U.S. ![]() Rainbow 5 clearly called for a defensive strategy in the Pacific until Germany should be defeated and, implicitly at least, accepted the loss of the Philippines, Guam, and Wake to the Japanese. It was a global plan, anticipating war by the United States against both Germany and Japan. Therefore, in January, February, and March, 1941, a new plan, Rainbow 5, grew out of staff talks between the United States and Great Britain. By late 1940 and early 1941 there was at least a tacit understanding in Washington that if Japan struck, the Philippines were doomed to early capture. The network of Japanese sea and air bases throughout the western Pacific, and the tremendous strength of Japan, which for years was grossly underestimated, made the hope of relief for the Philippines a chimera. The Orange-or War with Japan-plan envisaged a naval campaign: if United States and Filipino forces could hold the Bataan peninsula and the fortified islands at the entrance to Manila Bay, thus denying their use to an enemy for a period of three to six months, the Pacific Fleet would fight its way westward from Pearl Harbor and relieve and reinforce the defenses.īut long before Pearl Harbor, this concept had been challenged by some of our military planners. In 1941, Manila Bay was the focus of United States power in the Orient: all of our war plans emphasized its importance. ![]()
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